

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 30, 1984

NOTE FOR WILLIAM J. CASEY

FROM: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES

I am attaching a paper in which I raise some concerns about potential international problems in 1984.

I hope we might discuss this after my return to Washington on April 5.

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February 21, 1984

COUNTERING STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM
AND MY CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE
INTERNATIONAL VULNERABILITIES DURING 1984

Executive Registry

84-1455

I am writing this memorandum to raise a number of concerns which I hope can be discussed with you and several other NSC Staff members in a setting where we would have the time for an in-depth exchange of views. In summary, I believe that the Soviet bloc, its allies such as Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, South Yemen, and radical anti-western partners such as Libya and a variety of terrorist groups along with radical anti-western regimes such as Iran will increase their political-paramilitary war against governments friendly to the west and that there is a serious risk of additional foreign policy setbacks in 1984 which would harm our national security and also reduce the probability that President Reagan will be reelected. Virtually all of the elements of what I term the "destabilization coalition" want to accomplish both these purposes with their indirect aggression: weaken the United States and use foreign policy setbacks to defeat President Reagan.

State-Supported Terrorism--The "Destabilization Coalition"

Nearly four years ago in the New York Times (Tab I) I wrote that there was an "invisible war between radical and moderate forces for control of the oil and destiny of the Middle East and control of Central America and Mexico". I said there was a "destabilization coalition" which consisted of the Soviet bloc and Soviet allies; radical anti-western governments such as Libya, Syria, Iran; and, terrorist groups--marxist-leninist or anti-western, which cooperated in varying degrees against different target regimes but which shared the objectives of defeating and replacing governments friendly to the US.

Before the 1980 presidential election, I organized a small bipartisan group of experienced individuals (e.g., Paul Nitze, Sam Huntington, Max Kampelman) who shared the view that this problem of indirect aggression required a more correct conceptualization than was evident in most discussions of the "terrorism" issue and a practical program of both preventive and offensive political and paramilitary counteraction. The discussion paper I wrote for this group in 1980 defined the problem in these terms:

"During the last 35 years, the Soviet Union and those it controls have achieved a number of major gains through political warfare which uses a blend of propaganda, deception, competent organization, terrorism, and paramilitary methods. Our government has had great

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difficulty in taking prudent and timely preventive action because those techniques--often applied through proxies--intentionally keep the threat ambiguous while evading the responsibility of any single executive agency." (Tab II)

Four years of additional work on these issues have led me to the conclusions that Claire Sterling, Brian Crozier and other scholars are correct about the involvement of the Soviet bloc and its allies: "wars of national liberation" and "international terrorism" are supported and encouraged against pro-western regimes using a variety of intermediaries. The Soviet bloc often but not always picks the target regimes, influences the pace of destabilization through the level of lethal and covert assistance it offers but does not usually manage the day-to-day actions of international terrorist groups. In schematic form, the targets of the destabilization coalition follow with a likely high degree of mutual support and coordination among the first three elements (A, B, C):

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Active Against Pro-Western Governments in the Following Regions

Destabilization Elements

	<u>West Europe</u>	<u>Middle East</u>	<u>Sub-Saharan Africa</u>	<u>Asia</u>	<u>Latin America</u>
A/ Soviet bloc	x	x	x	x	x
B/Soviet <u>allies</u> :					
Vietnam					
North				x	x
Korea					
Cuba		x	x		x
Libya		x	x	x	x
Syria		x			
South					
Yemen		x			
Angola			x		
Mozambique			x		
Ethiopia		x	x		
Benin, etc.					
C/Regional Marxist/ Leninist terrorist groups from:					
West Europe	x	x			x
Middle					
East	x	x			x
Sub-Saharan Africa			x		
D/Iran					
E/"Islamic fundamentalist" & other stateless terrorist groups, e.g., Asia(some active in each region	x	x		x	

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Right now--with some important exceptions--this political paramilitary war is being fought only by the Soviet Union and those it supports. Except for Central America the West and the US have not decided to fight this "destabilization coalition" in the two places where it can be stopped without the risk of major and open military conflict: in the most important threatened countries and by neutralizing the transnational support networks. "Going to the source", when this requires major military forces, e.g., against the Soviet bloc or Cuba is a satisfying slogan but no useful guide to policy because both superpowers correctly want to keep this competition ambiguous and indirect. Therefore, the US and its friends must then turn this aggression back through political-paramilitary offensive and defensive action except in the few cases where partners would have overwhelming force and could inflict a military defeat on Soviet bloc proxies not yet protected by the "Brezhnev doctrine" e.g., Libya, Nicaragua, Angola.

The elements of an effective counterstrategy were identified as: a coherent and simultaneous program of (1) better political intelligence and timely political/institutional support for pro-western forces; (2) far more energetic international communications activities to affirm democratic/western values and accomplishments and tell the truth about communist international subversion and domestic failures; and (3) offensive action against terrorist groups, their transnational support networks and sustained efforts to help moderates replace newly established communist or pro-Soviet regimes (e.g., Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethiopia, Syria).

Some, but much too little of this has occurred. For the specific potential problem areas mentioned below, the above strategy remains relevant as a general guide, but specific actions must derive from the current details of each situation and the assets available to the US and its partners. To ensure brevity I shall simply sketch my current concerns and offer a few examples of possible preventive action.

Middle East--After the Lebanon Redeployment

In Lebanon, I believe that Syria and its Lebanese and Iranian terrorist/paramilitary partners will push for complete dominance and the visible humiliation of the US and its friends; this might include the "terrorist" killing of many key leaders who cooperated with the Gemayel government. The nexus of radical, anti-western groups are likely to begin preparations for destabilization attacks on the next targets which could include Jordan (where assassination and/or internal Palestinian versus Hashemite grievances might be the basis for externally supported destabilization). Other possible targets are one or more of the small Persian Gulf oil-producing states (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein,

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Oman) where Palestinians and Sheites add up to about half the population and where small traditional elites have become more vulnerable from the far left and modernizing elites using the charge of "feudalism" and from the Islamic fundamentalists using the charge of "corrupting westernization" even while their loyal tribal groups have become a demographic and cultural minority. Examples which illustrated the possible future threats include: the well-planned November 1979 coup attempt in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (the King was spared by having foregone services at the mosque due to a sore throat); the Bahrein coup attempt in December 1981; and the Kuwait bombings of December 1983, which reportedly included as targets (in addition to the French and the US) a number of Kuwaiti leaders.

Every element of the "destabilization coalition" has its own primary motivation for wanting to bring radical, anti-western regimes to power: the Soviet bloc in order to reignite an oil price increase which would stop the western and especially US economic recovery thereby lowering the probability of President Reagan's reelection. Also, this would be a major step toward developing "Libya-type" states as a prelude to Soviet dominance over Persian Gulf oil; Syria/Libya/Iran--all would see radical anti-western regimes in the Persian Gulf giving them additional partners, leading to an even more neutral and submissive Western Europe, thus further isolating Israel and also weakening the US and thereby making Israel more vulnerable; the Islamic fundamentalists would welcome the opportunity to reverse the cultural westernization and perhaps make common cause with Iran.

Possible Action Implications

- The US and its allies must prepare now to at least assure the physical survival and decent exile of Gemayel and others who trusted us--if that should be necessary.
- There should be retaliation against the individuals responsible for the Syrian-supported bombings against the US, France, and Israel (in January 1981 President Reagan vowed "swift and sure retribution").
- The oppressive Alawite minority dictatorship of Assad in Syria should be replaced by a moderate coalition through cooperation with all who need to be involved (Turkey, Iran, Israel share this interest).
- Transnational networks, facilities and training centers of the destabilization coalition must be neutralized; this should include preemptive attacks to keep the terrorist leaders and cadre on the defensive.

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-- A paramilitary "safety net" of deployable, competent persons must be readied for immediate action (including totally deniable) in the event of a sudden coup or assassination in any of the Middle Eastern countries deemed vital; this counter-action must occur immediately before the new regime can obtain diplomatic recognition, military assistance or support from the Soviet bloc or other anti-western governments.

The Philippines--A Potential Combination of 1979 Nicaragua and Iran

One-man authoritarian regimes, such as that of President Marcos, are the most fragile form of modern dictatorship, and there is virtual consensus that the Marcos regime will end. The only question is when and how. A relatively peaceful transition to functioning democracy is still possible, but the May 1984 election may provide the last opportunity for this to occur without a major convulsion. Unfortunately, it seems that the Marcos regime is not going to assure fair and open elections, and a large proportion of the genuinely democratic opposition is intent on boycotting the election. The result could be a slight liberalization combined with many, many more months of pressures leading to Marcos's resignation for reasons of health, an interim military regime and then elections followed by a constitutional government.

That is the optimistic possibility, but another scenario is also possible, and it could combine the speed of collapse seen in 1979 Iran (the Shah's regime moved from control to flight in 11 months) with the mistake made by the Catholic Church, the business community, and genuine democrats in 1979 Nicaragua: thinking anything was better than the dictator they wanted to remove, they joined in coalition with the marxist-leninist left.

The Philippines has all the ingredients for a Nicaragua-type internal revolution: a dictator opposed by virtually all major institutions and a large proportion of the public; an assassination of a leading democratic opponent of the dictator, a likely exposure of government coverup and subsequent public revulsion; a large externally-supported communist guerrilla movement (active during the 1940s, defeated, and now active again for many years) combined with a Libyan-supported "Muslim" guerrilla opposition (with the two armed movements ostensibly independent); a large mythical and real US presence (major military bases) to be used to rally "nationalist" anti-US sentiment; and, a current US Government caught between its democratic values, intimations of future danger from the destabilization of the current regime, and the protests of the regime that it is acting to undermine and replace it. An attractive strategy for the communists now would be to "endorse"

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the democratic agenda of the democratic opposition groups, offer to combine forces (with only the communists having the weapons and clandestine organizations in place) and then in a "broad opposition front" apply internal and international pressure (including boycotts of trade, aid, finance from Western Europe, Japan, etc.) to bring down the Marcos regime in the summer or autumn of 1984. If needed, the communists would not hesitate to assassinate Marcos and/or other key leaders of the current regime to hasten its collapse. The post-Marcos "broad-opposition" government would then most likely abrogate the military base agreements (assuming they had been signed), and the US could begin moving its forces out.

The motivation of the Soviet bloc and its partners is obvious--a major strategy victory over the US--and a major and most likely definitive electoral setback for President Reagan if it could be arranged before November 1984. Libya would also increase its contributions of money, weapons, and clandestine support as part of its partnership with Moscow and to further weaken the US, the best ally of Israel.

Possible Action Implications

-- Significantly expanded intelligence collection and analysis (including, as legally appropriate, systematic information on the democratic exile community outside of the Philippines, especially in the US).

-- Formulation and implementation of a strategy for democratic transition having three elements: (1) normal relations with the current regime--no episodic destabilizing actions, intended or not; (2) major but discreet expansion of relations with the genuinely democratic opposition; (3) increased action against external support networks for the communist and anti-democratic armed opposition groups.

-- Development of indicators of accelerated movement toward a change of regime or collapse; bi-weekly monitoring.

-- Development now of contingency plans for action in the event of several several different scenarios of political backdown.

Latin America--Possible Points of Dramatic Setback

In Central America the situation can hold through the end of 1984 if the Congress provides the economic and military support the Administration has requested. However, several possible concurrent pressures could cause dramatic negative changes, e.g., a far right coup in El Salvador, a collapse of the armed anti-Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, either of which would make

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a communist victory in El Salvador more likely. These pressures could include: a long delay in congressional funding and the allocation of too few military resources; the unwillingness of Congress to fund the anti-Sandinistas beyond June 30, 1984; the swing of the Contadora 9 countries from 7 to 2 (Nicaragua/Mexico) with us to 6 to 3 against us with a resulting false/ambiguous "peace agreement" in the summer of 1984 which undermines our friends and encourages Cuba, Nicaragua, and the communist guerrillas. This could be combined with a major additional commitment of Soviet bloc and Cuban support for the Central American guerrillas and terrorists in the hope of some additional communist successes which would also harm the 1984 reelection campaign of President Reagan.

The possibility of Soviet bloc/Cuban supported clandestine, apparently sudden seizures of power before November 1984 exists in Suriname (where Cuba can help the far left party dominate or replace Bouterse); Bolivia (where the three-level communist strategy to take the government from within seems to make steady progress); Guyana (where the aging dictator has appeased Cuba, where the Soviet bloc/Cuban presence far outnumbers ours, where a number of key government people are Cuban assets or strong sympathizers and where the largest opposition party has a marxist-leninist leader who was blocked from setting up a pro-Soviet/Cuban government in the 1960s but who remains eager for a second chance; and Haiti (where the 600 person presidential guard could be defeated by the estimated paramilitary assets of the seven marxist-leninist opposition groups--this is the least likely).

Possible Action Implications

-- For Central America, vigorous and timely implementation of NSDD 124 with special attention to obtaining additional funds for the anti-Sandinista program, adequate security aid to El Salvador, and \$2-3 million immediately for a systematic public diplomacy effort in Latin America and Europe--to include a major diplomatic/communications effort in Mexico.

-- For clandestine communist takeover targets (Suriname, Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti), expanded intelligence collection/analysis and much increased special activities to weaken and counter the various elements of the Soviet bloc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversive presence.

-- Additional specific programs would have to be designed for each country if a three-month intensive expansion of intelligence

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collection/analysis suggested the serious danger of clandestine communist takeovers in any of these countries (but will not know until we make the additional collection/analysis efforts).

Recommendation

I have not circulated this paper for review and comment by my colleagues--whom I greatly respect--because I thought you should have the benefit of one individual's sharply focused and clearly expressed concerns rather than the nuanced and more complex discussion that would inevitably result from a coordination process.

These possible negative contingencies may not become real threats before the end of 1984. Or, there could be other focal points for major crisis resulting from the pattern of political/paramilitary warfare against the US and its friends. However, the cumulation of apparently sudden dramatically negative events since the fall of Vietnam in 1975 which resulted from actions by some or all the components of the "destabilization coalition" suggests that the US must finally develop the capacity to counter this form of warfare and to act preventively--thereby avoiding major crises which present the harsh alternative of using massive force or hoping for the best while wringing our hands.

Therefore I recommend that you convene a small group of NSC staff with relevant expertise to discuss the above concerns--or that you request a coordinated NSC paper on possible negative contingencies in 1984 for discussion. If that discussion reveals that these or other concerns are shared by our colleagues, you might want to begin a more formal interagency process to design preventive actions.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 1980

WASHINGTON — History will mark the events in Iran, Afghanistan and Nicaragua in 1979 as a turning point in the invisible war between radical and moderate forces for control of the oil and destiny of the Middle East and control of Central America and Mexico.

In the Middle East, the outcome of the process now gaining momentum might include the replacement of the royal families in the oil states of the Arabian Peninsula by radical anti-Western regimes. Among the effects of such a change could be the use of Israel and oil supplies as the fulcrum to divide America from Europe and Japan, which depend on that region for more than 70 percent of their oil consumption. While encouraging radical destabilization in the Persian Gulf area, the Soviet Union could use a diplomacy of conciliation with Europe and Japan intended to end any meaningful alliance with America.

The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua last July encouraged leftist terrorists' assaults against the Governments of El Salvador and Guatemala; these continue to gain force and might succeed soon. That in turn would open Mexico to the politics of polarization through leftist terror and to possible destabilization by a coalition of reformist, radical and Communist groups opposed to the current regime. Mexico might then become an Iran-next-door.

United States policy toward the Middle East and the Central America-Mexico region must begin with a realistic understanding that the invisible political war that is raging could be lost. In Central America, this requires additional support for peaceful reform and immediate action against extremist and Cuban-supported terrorism. In the Middle East, adequate Western military power is necessary. However this alone will not preserve our interests against three converging radical forces.

Radicalism Abroad

By Constantine C. Menges

First, Palestinian terrorists, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, believe that after the ruling elites on the Arabian Peninsula are replaced by radicals, the Palestinians will be able to force the entire West to abandon Israel. Second, the radical Governments of Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iran and, to some degree, Iraq, share this view, but they would remain hostile to the democracies even without the pretext of Israel because their leaders believe much of the Marxist mythology about Western "evils." Third, the Soviet Union and its client governments, among them Southern Yemen's, aim to do anything possible, short of risking major war, that will bring the oil closer to their control.

Targets for these three destabilizing forces include President Anwar el-Sadat and the oil regimes on the Arabian Peninsula along with Yemen and Oman. The failure to meet the May 26 deadline for completing negotiations for Palestinian autonomy could be the cue for Palestinian terrorists to work with Libya and with Egyptian radicals to try to replace Mr. Sadat.

Last November, the attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca was aimed at overthrowing the monarchy in Saudi Arabia. Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are even more vulnerable, since their Palestinian and Shiite Moslem minorities add up to about half the population in each state. The practical approach to

destabilization in the small oil states might combine pressures and threats from neighboring Iran or Iraq with internal upheavals encouraged by radicals.

Simultaneously, Soviet proxies might be active. After the summer Olympics have ended, Cubans and East Germans might help Communist Southern Yemen or Libya make use of the hundreds of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery and mobile air-defense missiles already stockpiled in those countries.

What should be done? Rather than waiting passively for destabilization to strike one country after another, a coalition of democracies and Islamic nations must take the offensive against radical and terrorist networks. Decades of repression of Islam inside the Soviet Union, and the brutality in Afghanistan, should be used to show Moslem peoples the consequences of Soviet dominance. There should be a solution providing for Palestinian autonomy based on democratically chosen authority and for the security of Israel. This will be possible only if the radical forces are contained.

It is an illusion to believe that anything other than the disappearance of Israel would satisfy any of the three radical forces. The democracies must use conservation of energy, technology and unity to establish real economic counterpressures to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. And finally, there must be a concerted but private proposal to the Soviet Union: Stop your indirect war against the moderate governments of oil states or there will be a complete cessation of economic transactions with many of the democratic nations.

Constantine C. Menges, editor of "International Strategic Issues," a newsletter, is author of "Spain: The Struggle for Democracy Today."



December 23, 1980

RE: Proposal for the establishment of a small group to plan and coordinate United States international political action.

ISSUE

During the last 35 years, the Soviet Union and those it controls have achieved a number of major gains through political warfare which uses a blend of propaganda, deception, competent organization, terrorism and para/military methods. Our government has had great difficulty in taking prudent and timely preventive action because those techniques - often applied through proxies - intentionally keep the threat ambiguous while evading the responsibility of any single executive agency.

The President and his senior foreign policy advisors are virtually absorbed by the inevitable pressures of the normal agenda of foreign relations. The operating staff leadership (e.g., Assistant Secretaries) tends to lack the required world-wide and long-term (1 to 3 years) perspectives, nor do the usual organizational approaches provide for the political intuition and drive required to design workable political action programs.

PROPOSED ACTION

For a limited number of high priority areas or issues (e.g., Central America/Mexico; the Persian Gulf; the Socialist International) there is a requirement for a special group which could integrate the public and covert aspects of United States resources to carry out the following tasks: 1) propose strategies and political action programs which use diplomacy, influence on and support of private groups, ideological and information resources and covert action; and 2) coordinate and develop support for these programs in appropriate agencies.

The group might also encourage change within the government and support the development of a government funded Freedom Foundation which could provide open but discreet and non-official support for a variety of genuinely democratic groups in high priority countries.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

The President and the Cabinet-level National Security Council would provide the policy guidance for implementation by the group. It might function best under the direct supervision of the Special Assistant for National Security though it should also have direct access to the Secretaries of State, and Defense, and the DCI.

Within the framework of this senior leadership, the group will focus on United States political action objectives and work primarily by energizing and persuading the operating organizations rather than by the exercise of any general authority. It will argue on the merits and will not have any budgets or agency interests to defend, nor will it have any access to or visibility in the national media.

Attachments

Concept papers: Effective international political action--an urgent priority for the administration, 4 pp.
International political action--alternative methods for implementation, 3 pp.

EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION -- AN URGENT PRIORITY FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION

There is a broad public consensus that the United States must make additional efforts to assure adequate strategic and conventional military forces while pursuing sensible arms control. While much remains to be done in order to translate this widely shared perception into actions which will deter the direct use of Soviet or proxy forces in regions of vital interest, the challenge is now clear to most.

Unfortunately, there is a second dimension of geopolitical danger which is far less well understood at present. Since 1945, the Soviet Union has waged political warfare with some failures but notable success in Eastern Europe, Asia, Cuba, Africa, and more recently the Middle East and Central America. Economically and ideologically the Soviets have many dimensions of profound failure. Unfortunately these failures -- while important -- do not allow us to ignore this arena. Their complex process of working to weaken the democratic nations by encouraging and helping communist or radical groups overthrow pro-western or moderate governments has begun to gain momentum since 1975.

This has been especially true in the Persian Gulf and the Central America/Mexico regions where the outcome of the current invisible war between moderate or anti-communist and pro-Soviet or radical political forces could determine control over the oil and destiny of those two vital regions. For example, the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua, the present virtual dominance of the communist groups there, along with the pace of Cuban supported terrorism in El Salvador and Guatemala all point toward more victories for the totalitarian left in the near future (possibly after forcing right-wing coups or repression by their polarizing tactics.)

That, in turn, could open Mexico to the politics of polarization through terror and destabilization by a coalition of communist, radical and reformist groups opposed to the injustices of the current one-party regime. Mexico might then become "The Iran Next Door" with highly destructive international and domestic political effects.

Experts have disagreed about the extent of Soviet control and direction of each and every anti-western terrorist or guerrilla group. However, the following construct offers a perspective on the nature of the political-paramilitary war being fought against US interests by hostile groups which agree on targets for destabilization and cooperate with each other in various degrees.

Political-Paramilitary War Against US Interests in Three Strategic Arenas

TARGET COUNTRIES

DESTABILIZATION COALITION

Latin America

Colombia
Venezuela
Central America
Panama
Belize
Mexico*

Cuba
Regional communist/guerrilla groups
USSR
Palestinian terrorists/Libya

Middle East

Egypt
Iran
Oman
North Yemen
Egypt
Persian Gulf regimes
Saudi Arabia*

USSR
Pro-Soviet regimes (South Yemen, Syria)
Cuba
Palestinian guerrillas
Libya

Africa

Zaire
Morocco
Sudan
Namibia
South Africa*

USSR
Cuba
Libya
Pro-Soviet regimes (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique)
Regional guerrillas/communist groups (SWAPO)

*Designates the main strategic target

Effective political action by the United States is an essential but largely missing element of foreign policy. The following three main elements are the ingredients of a sound political action strategy:

Support for reformist, moderate, pro-western forces

- Better political analysis and intelligence to identify friendly/moderate, neutral and hostile groups within the foreign nations of vital interest:
- Timely efforts to provide support to friendly groups such as political parties, labor unions, civic associations, media, religious (public but discreet, covert only if necessary).

International communication

- More energetic communications efforts which take political ideas seriously and bring about honest and vigorous debates with the zealous, often misinformed elites in developing countries who have accepted many of the myths preached by communist and other radical groups concerning the comparative international effects of the democratic and communist nations;
- Finding effective ways to affirm the accomplishments of the industrial democracies in social and economic as well as political terms while factually discussing the repression, economic failure, poverty and elitism of the communist societies.

Offensive action against terrorist, radical groups and their transnational supporting networks -- Soviet, Cuban...

- Improved analysis of the Soviet/radical transnational networks supporting terrorist and destabilizing groups.
- Covert, offensive action to reduce political violence in regions of direct interest by penetration, exposures, harassment and neutralization.
- The discreet use of economic sanctions (and incentives where appropriate) in situations where Soviet sponsored terrorism threatens to succeed before countermeasures can be implemented.
- Sustained efforts to help moderates replace newly established communist or pro-Soviet regimes in important regions; Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethiopia, Angola...

In facing up to the task of organizing for international political action, especially against the Soviet threat, there are several dilemmas that we need to face and that will require careful balancing. The Soviet Union, as a totalitarian system, is able to use the technique of operating differently on two or more levels so that official state behavior and state-ments are often in sharp contrast to other actions of the government and those it controls and manipulates. Because our decision-making system involves commitment to democratic values, a large public and many centers of power and influence, we have to be effective in a different way.

In brief, a workable program of political action must be constrained by the following considerations:

- 1. Total antagonism to the Soviet Union is not appropriate because of United States public attitudes, attitudes of other countries, and because of the need to work with the Soviets against common hazards and to avoid war.
- 2. Some of the most important problems and dangers in the world have fundamental causes quite apart from the Soviet Union--although the Soviets may exploit these problems and make them much more dangerous.
- 3. Communism is not monolithic: Communists sometimes work against each other and sometimes fight each other.
- 4. The Soviets have great economic weaknesses internally which in combination with a unified Western strategy offer potential sanctions against their political warfare.

Dr. Constantine Menges
December 1980